Institute of Islamic Studies 
and 

Centre for Study of Society and Secularism
 
 

Asghar Ali Engineer is a rights activist and heads two organisations, the Institute of Islamic Studies and the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism. He has authored or edited 44 books on such issues as Islam and communal and ethnic problems in India and South Asia in general.

For links to his other articles, please go to the top page of this site.


THE PROBLEMATIQUE OF NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTH ASIA
--THE CASE OF PAKISTAN
Asghar Ali Engineer
  
                                                                                                 
Secular Perspective (March 16-31, 2000)

 The concept of nation and nationhood is more recent than the concept of country and patriotism. Of course in South Asian situation the concepts of nation and of country often get mixed up and are treated even as synonymous. The concept of country, called watan or mulk  in north Indian languages, has been with us for as long as one knows about. Watan or mulk was a shared geographical area ruled by a common ruler and inhabited by the people belonging to different castes and creeds, or even speaking different languages. And love of ones country or mulk  (patriotism) was considered as the highest virtue. The country, ruled by a monarch or a prince, used to be quite heterogeneous in character and what was common was territory alone. Thus it hardly constituted a nation in the western classical sense. It was more of an administrative unit be it under the Moghul or under the British. India was thus never a nation in the western classical sense.

 Then what constitutes a nation? Various definitions have been advanced by different scholars and social scientists. A nation is usually defined as a territory inhabited by those who share common history, common culture, common language and common economy. Thus in western sense a nation cannot be multi-cultural or multi-linguistic. It is totally a homogeneous entity. This is how the modern nations came into existence in the continent of Europe in sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which became model for others to emulate. The North America, which was colonised by the British, was somewhat of an exception. The people of different ethnic origin from all over Europe went there in search of better prospects but when a common nationhood emerged there after declaration of independence in 1789, a common America identity was stressed, often referred to as the melting pot model of identity. Thus the American nationhood deviated from the classical European nationhood, as America had emerged as a nation from a colonised country.

 This is precisely what happened with most of the colonised countries in Asia and Africa. The colonial countries like France, Italy or Britain conquered as much area as they could and brought them under their administration. When these countries were liberated from the clutches of imperialism they were multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic. But they became modern nations. Not only this, the rival colonial powers divided territories amongst themselves during colonial days cutting into pieces homogeneous ethnic and linguistic communities. This of course added to the problematique of the nation building in the post-colonial arena.

 The South Asia was no exception to this. Almost entire South Asia was conquered by the British from 18th to 19th century. It included Burma and Ceylon as well. Ceylon and Burma separated from Indian sub-continent before India became free. However, even after separation of Burma (now known as Myanmar) and Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka) India remained, what one would say, a multi-national country. There were various ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural groups spread across the country. Yet, it was stressed, and rightly so, there was a thread of unity and our national leaders gave a slogan of ‘unity in diversity’. While fighting against the colonial power it was easier to maintain unity though fissures had began to develop along caste and religious lines even during those days of common struggle. The scheduled castes and tribes demanded their share in power and in government jobs. But this problem could be resolved with comparative ease by conceding reservations for SCs and STs. The struggle for reservation was led by several low caste leaders, particularly, by Babasaheb Ambedkar.

 However, the main fissure was along religious lines. The Hindus and the Muslims had lived with each other during the medieval period; particularly during the Moghal rule  a common and composite culture had evolved over the centuries of their co-existence. But once freedom struggle intensified (in which Hindus and Muslims participated together) and prospects of independence were seen nearing at hand, the elites of the two communities developed serious differences over the question of power-sharing in independent India. The Muslim League led by M.A.Jinnah demanded higher share in power for the Muslims and also proper constitutional guarantees and arrangements in this respect. The Cabinet Mission Plan had almost resolved the problem and the Congress and the League had entered into the Union Government, but doubts persisted; and some unguarded statements by nationalist leaders led to the breaking down of that arrangement; and ultimately partition came about.

 Thus two nations were created out of one country and yet both these nations were not nations as defined above or they hardly followed the western classical pattern. Apparently the country was divided along religious lines thus giving birth to a new concept of nation i.e. a nation based on religion. This was never the concept behind the European nations. It was cultural and linguistic unity, which was thought to be more fundamental than religious unity. Thus a new theory of nationhood was sought to be developed by Mr. Jinnah. The irony of it was that Jinnah himself never gave much importance to religion in his own personal life. And, after the formation of Pakistan too, he said in his address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly that they were all Pakistanis and religion was their private matter. Thus Jinnah created Pakistan on the basis of a theory he himself was not convinced of. 

 The Muslim theologians, members of the Jami`at al-`Ulama-i-Hind, on the other hand, rejected the concept of religious nationalism and justified the concept of composite nationalism and maintained that the concept of composite nationalism was not against the teachings of Islam. Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, the Rector of Darul `Ulum, Deoband, wrote a treatise on the subject, Islam aur Muttahida Qaumiyyat and proved, by quoting from the Qur’an and Hadith that composite nationalism was in conformity with the teachings of Islam. Thus the `Ulama did not support the partition project. It was the Muslim elite who were more enthusiastic about it. It is an interesting contradiction, which must be noted. The secular elite among Muslims demanded the partition on religious lines. And the orthodox theologians among them opposed it vehemently. The secular elite was using religion (rather than believing in)  for political bargain and when it failed to get  the desired share, it separated. Thus really speaking religion was not the basis of partition, it was political vested interest of the elite. 

THE PROBLEMS OF THE NATION BUILDING

 The problems of the nation building appeared on the scene once both the countries – i.e. India and Pakistan, gained independence. Religious solidarity in Pakistan soon gave way to hard realities of life and serious fissures began to develop on ethnic and sectarian lines. The Urdu speaking muhajirs who were most active for creation of Pakistan soon realised that they were strangers in Pakistan as they had no ethnic and cultural roots in that country. There was time when the muhajirs dominated politics, bureaucracy and economy. But that lasted for a short period. Soon the Punjabis, the dominant nationality in Pakistan began to assert itself and pushed out the muhajirs from all important positions. The muhajirs soon began to feel alienated from the nation building process. The process of edging them out intensified with the rise of Zulfeqar Ali Bhutto in power. Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had a strong base in Sindh and it catered to Sindhi nationalism. There were clashes between the Sindhis and muhajirs in Karachi and Hyderabad (Sindh). Hundreds were killed in these clashes.

 Earlier the Bengali speaking Muslims chose to secede from Pakistan. Though the Bengali speaking Muslims were in majority and in 1970 elections the National Awami Party led by Mujibur Rehman won majority the West Pakistan politicians did not allow him to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan alleged that they were not being treated fairly and that the East Pakistan had become an internal colony of West Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims were also highly proud of their Bengali language and culture and strongly resented imposition of Urdu as a national language. They wanted to retain their cultural and linguistic autonomy. The West Pakistan politicians were rather insensitive to the Bengali cultural and linguistic heritage. Also, Pakistan remained under long spells of military dictatorship and hardly had the concept of autonomous civil society. Thus the East Pakistani Muslims had no democratic space to exploit for redressal of their grievances. An armed rebellion broke out and Bangla Desh came into existence after  year long liberation struggle. 

 The cessation of Bangla Desh from Pakistan proved once for all that religion cannot be a viable basis of political and national unity between disparate ethnic and cultural groups. Even after the cessation of Bangla Desh the Pakistan is seriously dogged by ethnic conflicts. India opted for linguistic states immediately after independence thus fulfilling the linguistic aspirations of  different linguistic groups. However, Pakistan chose to remain unitary denying autonomy to various linguistic provinces like Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. The Pakhtoonistan struggle earlier led by Badshah Khan (the Frontier Gandhi, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan ) was also crushed. There is strong assertion of regional and ethnic personalities and a demand for formation of autonomous linguistic provinces. However, the Punjab, in order to retain its hegemony, refuses to accept the concept of provincial autonomy. Strangely, Punjab itself is facing the problem of Saraiki nationalism. The Saraiki speakers in Punjab maintain that they are in majority in Punjab and not the Punjabi speaking people. They are agitating to form Saraikistan. 

  Karachi has been witnessing great deal of blood bath for last several years. First there were clashes between the muhajirs and Sindhis. Then the muhajirs and the Pathans fought and hundreds were killed in those riots. When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power he tried to redress Sindhi grievances by giving them greater share in government jobs which so far they were deprived of. This was, needless to say, at the cost of the muhajirs who had enjoyed all the privileges. This made them desperate and having lost all privileges in Pakistan the muhajir frustration surfaced in various forms. A Muhajir Qaumi Movement led by university students came into existence. This movement came into existence during Zia’s time. Now the Muhajir Qaumi Movement’s activists are clashing with the police and para- military forces rather than the Sindhi nationalists. The MQM movement has become highly violent. The Zia Government cleverly divided it through infiltration of intelligence people. The MQM split into two, one led by its founder Altaf Husain and the other led by his rivals and known as the Haqiqi Muhajir Qaumi Movement usually referred to as the Haqiqi.

 Karachi is facing same set of problems as similar mega cities are facing in other countries. Karachi being centre of finance and industries – it being the only port city in Pakistan – faces stream of influx of population from all parts of Pakistan. Also, at the time of partition it took all the burden of migration. While the Punjabi Muslims naturally preferred Punjab for migration, the Urdu speakers found Karachi as the natural choice. Karachi, at the time of partition was a small city of a few lakhs. After partition its population increased several fold. Then began economic development and with it an endless in migration from all parts of the country. Today Karachi is overflowing with more than 10 million people. Though it is capital of Sindh, the Sindhis are less than one fifth in the city. In such a situation it is bound to develop severe ethnic strains and stresses. No wonder Karachi is the centre of major ethnic strife in Pakistan today.

 Pakistan is facing another serious problem that of sectarian violence particularly since the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The exact proportion of Shi`ahs in Pakistani population is a disputed matter. The Sunnis say, it is no more than 10 per cent. The Shi`ahs, on the other hand, maintain it is as high as 40 per cent. The truth perhaps lies somewhere in between. There may be around 20% Shi`ahs in Pakistan. The Shi`ahs definitely suffer from minority syndrome. The Iranian Islamic revolution made them not only proud but also confident. The first major clash occurred on the question of payment of Islamic tax zakat. The Zia regime’s Islamisation made it compulsory for all Muslims to pay zakat and zakat was to be deducted from the bank account. The Shi`ahs resisted this saying that they cannot pay zakat to the Sunni state. It can be paid only to the Shi`ah religious leaders. They took out a huge morcha in Islamabad. The Shi`ahs were now much better organised and forced Zia Government to exempt them from payment of zakat. The anti-zakat movement was led by Tehrik-e-Jafariya. This and other factors gave rise to Sunni backlash. 

 A section of Sunnis formed Sipah-e-Sahabah to counter the activities of Tehrik-e-Jafariyah. The two organisations often clashed and killed each other’s members. In number of instances motor cycle riders will come with AK-47 and fire on people offering prayers inside the mosque or on those going with funeral procession. Hundreds have died in this sectarian violence. It is interesting to note that while Karachi is centre of ethnic violence certain cities of Punjab are witnessing sectarian violence between Sh`ahs and Sunnis. Karachi is centre of ethnic violence obviously because it has become melting pot of various ethnic groups due to constant influx of population from various parts of Pakistan as explained above. In Punjab there is different dynamics altogether. Punjab is desperately trying to maintain its hegemony over all other provinces. Its hegemony is being deeply resented by other provinces i.e. Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. In all these provinces there are separatist movements or movements for autonomy. The only way Punjab can maintain its political hegemony is through assertion of Islamic identity as against ethnic identities. 

 It is for this reason that sectarianism is growing fast in Punjab. Zia started the process of Islamisation for legitimising his regime. But there was another reason too. He was facing greatest challenge to his authority from non-Punjabi ethnic groups like Sindhis, Baluchis and also partly from muhajirs. He tried to destroy the Qaumi Muhajir Movement by manipulating and splitting it vertically. It is also interesting to note that the Qaumi Muhajir Movement has prevented Shi`ah-Sunni strife from developing in Karachi. The Urdu speaking Shi`ahs and Sunnis are united to resist the Punjabi domination. Even Zia, despite his success in splitting the MQM could not destroy it. It still yields tremendous influence among the Urdu speaking population of Sindh. Thus it can be said that ethnic identity is far more powerful than religious or Islamic identity among the non-dominant groups of Pakistan. In Punjab Islamic identity is far more important as it is dominant group and uses more universal identity to counter assertion of local ethnic identities.

 It is for this reason that Punjab has become centre of Islamic movements and sectarian movements are far more assertive there. The Jamat-e-Islami at one time had great hold on Urdu speaking muhajirs until sixties. The muhajirs tried to make themselves acceptable in Pakistan (where they had no ethnic, linguistic or cultural roots) through assertion of their universal i.e. religious identity. But when they failed to carve out a permanent space in civil society of Pakistan and began to feel marginalised they replaced religious discourse with ethnic one. The Jamat was replaced by MQM, which employed purely ethnic discourse. Thus Jamat was considerably weakened in Sindh, particularly in Karachi and it gathered more strength in Punjab, which was in need of universal identity (i.e. Islamic identity). Zia’s Islamisation project was far more successful in Punjab and it left other dominated provinces quite cold.

 The Islamic extremist movements are growing more in Punjab than any other provinces in Pakistan today. Again, it is Punjab, which is more obsessed with the Kashmir problem. Kashmir has become important for Punjab for yet another reason. It is being claimed on the basis of two- nation theory and two-nation theory is hardly important now to other provinces who are its victim. The logic of two-nation theory is that religious solidarity is above, and transcends ethnic solidarity. Kashmiris also value their ethnic identity more than their Islamic identity and hence their problem with Indian nationalism also. The Kashmiri Islam has strong indigenous element which is different from other Islamic traditions and which imparts them a unique islamic personality of its own. In their fight with Indian dominant nationalism, a section of Kashmiris might assert their universal Islamic identity but it has no popular support. But the Punjab in Pakistan is trying to desperately emphasise universal Islamic identity in Kashmir to legitimise two-nation theory and thus maintain a sense of Islamic solidarity in Pakistan as a whole to retain its own hegemony over other marginalised ethnic groups. 

 The leaders like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan had grasped this truth very well much earlier. He knew, through his own experience that overarching universal identity (like the Islamic identity) will be pitted against the local or ethnic identity (like the Pakhtun identity) and Pathans in Pakistan will never be allowed full autonomous growth. He, therefore, vehemently opposed creation of Pakistan. In a democratic process of nation-building all ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic identities should have equal chance to flourish. Then only nation-building could be a less problematic process. But either a dominant religious or ethnic group tries to obstruct this as it demolishes its dominant position and emphasises real or imagined overarching religious or national identity to retain its own domination. In India it is again the religious right which insists on either the Hindutva or overarching Indian identity at the cost of more democratic regional, ethnic or other minority identities.

 India being democratic the religious right cannot assert itself beyond certain point. However, in Pakistan, the majority religion can be much more assertive as civil society is weaker there and the state controlled by not only majority religious identity but also dominant ethnic identity (that of Punjab) is far stronger. The Punjabi identity could assert itself strongly even in 1970 despite majority of Bengali speaking Muslims in East Pakistan. The Bengali speaking Muslims thus saw no other alternative than to secede from Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that in united Pakistan the Punjabi identity proved far stronger than the Islamic solidarity. Thus it is hegemonic assertion of an ethnic identity which proves more decisive than religious unity. However, today in Pakistan, there is combination of hegemonic ethnic identity and religion. It is the ruling classes in Punjab, which are fanning religious extremism in its desperate efforts to maintain unity of Pakistan on its own conditions.

 In the post-modernity era the process of nation building can become seriously flawed if it is not truly democratic and based on respect for diversity, plurality and human dignity. A truly democratic process demands that all ethnic groups, big or small, should enjoy full autonomy and equal opportunity to flourish. All religious, linguistic and cultural groups, in majority or minority, should have sense of being equal partners in the process of nation building. Even if the smallest ethnic or religious group develops the sense of being left out the process of nation building can face serious trouble. All nations in South Asia are facing problems today precisely because the non-dominant ethnic, cultural or religious groups have no sense of equal partnership in the process of nation building. They feel not only left out but also victims of hate campaign. No wonder then that there is serious ethnic and religious conflict in all the countries in South Asia like India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The Tamil question in Sri Lanka arose because in 1961 Constitution adopted by the Sri Lanka Parliament did not give the Tamil language its due. The Tamil group felt severely aggrieved. It ultimately took to violence when the problem was not solved democratically. The same is true of the Kashmir problem in India. The Union Government at Delhi never allowed democratic dissent to strike roots in Kashmir. It always wanted a stooge government in Kashmir undermining its Kashmiri identity. Now India is paying heavy price for it. Had the Central Government allowed true democratic processes to flourish in Kashmir the Kashmiri youth would not have taken to violence on such a scale. In case of Kashmir the problem was again compounded by religion and ethnicity combining together. 

 Thus in South Asia the colonial heritage on one hand, and serious lapses on the part of ruling classes in post-colonial period, on the other, have made the process of nation building more problematic than it would have been. More autonomy for the civil society, greater space for expression of ethnic identity, respect for diversity and regard for distributive justice can go a long way in promoting peace and harmony in South Asian nations.   
 



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Posted 23 March 2000
Last revised 23 March  2000, 1:00 am CST
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